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Introduction: Governance and Democracy 
Whatever ‘governance’ is, it is certainly aimed at involving stakeholders. The literature 
gives various reasons for the necessity of involving stakeholders and thus why 
(interactive) governance can be more effective than more classical forms of steering. In 
general, they fall into three categories (see for instance Kooiman 1993; Kickert et al. 
1997; Pierre 2000; Sorensen and Torfing 2007): 
 
1. stakeholders have to be involved because governments are dependent on their 
resources (‘veto power’ argument); 
2. stakeholders are involved because they have specific knowledge and can enhance the 
quality of the problem definition or even more so the quality and innovative character 
of the solutions (‘quality’ argument); 
3. stakeholders have to be involved to enhance the democratic quality of decision-
making in modern network societies (‘democratic legitimacy’ argument) 
 
Governance and Representative Democracy: Friends or Enemies? 
The fact that governance processes involve a plurality of value judgments of many 
involved actors is almost undisputed (Osborne 2010).
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 This means that governance 
processes are also (but not only) forms to reconcile value differences, which inevitably 
connects them with the classical democratic institutions that are traditionally thought of 
as the institutions to carry out this function. A substantial part of the governance literature 
takes the value problem and the relation (or tension) between governance processes and 
democratic institutions as one of the core subjects (Hirst 2000; Klijn and Koppenjan 
2000; Fung and Wright 2001; Sorensen 2002; Edelenbos 2005). Generally, many authors 
recognise tensions between the idea of representative democracy, with its more vertical 
accountability structure, and governance processes, which have a more horizontal and 
                                                 
1
 Governance networks will be used here as an indication of more or less stable patterns of social 
relationships ( interactions, cognitions and rules) between mutually dependent public, semi-public and 
private actors, that arise and build up around complex policy issues or policy programmes. Governance, 
then, refers to the interaction processes that take place within those networks. 
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less clearly accountability structure. This tension is confirmed by empirical research 
(Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Edelenbos 2005, Skelcher et al. 2005). 
 
In the literature, we find four main positions about the relationship between 
governance processes and representative institutions (Klijn and Skelcher 2007): 
 
1.  Incompatible position: classical representational democracy is incompatible with 
governance processes because these are a threat to the position of democratic 
institutions. The authority of democratic institutions is 'hollowed out' by the 
involvement of other stakeholders. This position is found especially in more classical 
political science literature. 
2. Complementary position: governance processes provide for additional links to society 
and can perfectly co-exist beside classical democratic institutions.   They provide 
elected officials information, and accountability is shared, but political officeholders 
retain an important position. 
3. Transition position: governance networks offer greater flexibility and efficiency and 
will gradually replace representative democracy as the dominant model in the 
network society. 
4. Instrumental position: governance networks provide a means for democratic 
institutions to increase their control in a situation of societal complexity. By setting 
performance targets, elected office holders secure a dominant position. 
 
The second and the fourth positions could be said to consider governance and democratic 
institutions as friends, while positions one and three consider them as enemies, or at least 
as opposites.  
 
Interactive governance: democratic? 
When it comes to interactive governance, the question of whether the processes are 
democratic is an important one. On the one hand they can clash with the classical 
institutions of representative democracy, but on the other hand the processes themselves 
should be democratic. This is the question of the democratic legitimacy of interactive 
decision-making. Criteria are required to evaluate the democratic character (or the 
‘democratic anchorage’, see Sorensen and Torfing 2007) of decisions made in interactive 
processes 
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Democratic Legitimacy: Towards an Analytical Framework 
Determining those that criteria make decision-making democratic is more difficult that it 
appears because we can identify different models of democracy.  
 
Models of Democracy 
MacPherson puts forward four different models of democracy, in the history of political 
philosophy, each stressing different core elements of democracy (MacPherson, 1979): 
 
1. Utopian model: in which democracy is the will of the people expressed by the people. 
Democracy is the best way to serve the common purpose (by means of participation 
of individuals in the government) and the best way to develop individuals. Rousseau 
with his ‘general will of the people’ and Jefferson provide examples of this model. 
2. Protective model: in which democracy is mainly understood as a protection of 
citizens by their governments. Important institutional features protect the freedom of 
individuals and their freedom against the state. Individual votes in this liberal model 
are an effective expression of the citizens’ wishes. James Mill and Jeremy Bentham 
are proponents of this second model;  
3. Developmental model: stresses the participation of citizens as both a good way to 
organise democracy, and develop and actively enhance the freedom of citizens. John 
Stuart Mill is the leading exponent of this model 
4. Competitive model: in which democracy is a mechanism for decision-making where 
political leaders compete to gain votes. One of the most prominent authors of this 
model is Schumpeter (1943).  
 
Schumpeter criticised the classical model for holding unrealistic demands on 
participation and the way citizens are informed. His now famous definition of democracy 
is: ‘that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ 
(Schumpeter 1943: 269)’. This idea of competition is later taken further by the pluralists 
(Dahl 1956; Truman 1956) who see democracy as a plurality of groups struggling for 
power. Downs (1956) presents the image of democracy as a marketplace where voters act 
rationally and choose a political leader and a programme, and parties and leaders try to 
maximise votes. Legitimacy in this model is connected to the procedure that is followed 
(the voting) and the fact that political office holders are accountable and can be dismissed 
at the next election. 
 
If we look at MacPherson (1979), his model of democracy provides two 
competing ideas: the idea that democracy is an arrangement to reach (efficient) decisions 
and protect individual freedom and the idea that democracy embodies normative ideas 
and rules about how we should organise our society. This is a society where people 
actively take part in decisions, developing themselves and the society as a whole. He calls 
the two competing models ‘protective’ and ‘developmental’ democracy.  
 
The same distinction is emphasised by Pateman (1970), who compares some of 
the classical theorists on democracy. Pateman mentions elections and responsiveness of 
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political leaders to citizens, political equality and participation as major characteristics of 
democracy (Pateman 1970: 14). These characteristics can also be found in the four 
different models of MacPherson, although they receive different emphasis. 
 
More recently, models of ‘deliberative’ democracy (Dryzek 2000; Hirst 2000; 
Held 2006) add other characteristics, especially the idea of open debate among involved 
stakeholders about solutions (see also Fisher 2003). The key to deliberative models of 
democracy is: ‘the transformation of private preferences via a process of deliberation into 
positions that can withstand public scrutiny and test’ (Held 2006: 237). Essential to most 
forms of deliberative democracy is that preferences are not fixed, but can change in a 
debate, or as Dryzek tells us: ‘The only condition for authentic deliberation is then the 
requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in non-coercive 
fashion’ (Dryzek 2000: 2). But then for this deliberation to be successful, another kind of 
core characteristic of democracy is introduced, which could be described as ‘openness’ or 
at least it has to do with a number of rules and practices that all are connected to the 
process of discussion, information, plurality of values, etc. Deliberative models of 
democracy stress that besides the fact that officeholders are accountable and can be 
replaced (the core of the protective models of democracy) and that democracy is about 
participation in decisions being made (the core of the developmental models of 
democracy), democratic legitimacy can come from the characteristics of the process 
(openness, flow of information, argumentation process, etc.). 
 
Sources of Democratic Legitimacy  
Democratic legitimacy could be said to originate from three sources, which, of course, 
are related, but which receive different emphasis according to model (Skelcher and 
Sullivan 2007): 
 
1. Accountability: this is strongly emphasised by the more protective models of 
democracy whereby office holders are accountable for decisions and for the decision-
making process. The office holders (is it clear who is accountable?) and the 
procedures that hold them accountable (voting to get them in and, more importantly, 
the means to get them out of office) and various rules that protect citizens are 
stressed.  
2. Voice: how are citizens able to exercise voice and influence decisions? In this source 
of legitimacy, it is not the passive influence that is important, but rather the active 
ways in which citizens can participate in concrete decisions and the processes by 
which these are achieved that are emphasised. From the participation literature 
(Arnstein, 1971; Berry 1993; Young, 2000), one can make distinctions such as the 
depth of participation (the intensity and the influence of stakeholders) and the width 
of participation (how many stakeholders are allowed to participate (Berry et al. 1993), 
or one could distinguish levels of participation (Arnstein 1971). 
3. Due deliberation: this source of democratic legitimacy is strongly connected to how 
the interaction and deliberation process is organised. Democratic legitimacy arises out 
of a deliberative process, guaranteed by fair procedures and agreement between 
actors, where they share knowledge, explore possible solutions and exchange value 
judgments. This does not requires something like a power-free dialogue (compare 
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Habermas (Habermas, 1981 and his ‘herscheiftsfreie discussion’). Dryzek (2000) tells 
us that people who would favour the Habermas ideal speech situation would be very 
vulnerable to criticism from a number of theoretical insights. He tells us: ‘In a 
pluralistic world, consensus is unattainable, unnecessary, and undesirable. More 
feasible and attractive is workable agreements in which participants agree on a course 
of action, but for different reasons (Dryzek 2000: 170). Interestingly, this very much 
resembles ideas in the literature on governance networks on outcomes, packages of 
goals, etc. (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). It is the institutional characteristics, such as 
fair entry, reciprocity, freedom of coercion, open information access and lack of 
manipulation, that are important here, but also the empirical manifestations of these 
principles. 
 
Democratic Legitimacy in Governance Networks 
The first step has now been taken in our attempt to define some of the, more or less, 
accepted norms for democratic legitimacy. These norms are in general derived from the 
wide variety of democratic models that exist and are discussed by authors in the field. But 
the next point to address is how these norms or principles apply to governance networks. 
 
Because in network-like situations we come up against some problems these 
principles are applied to ‘measure’ democratic anchorage. The first obvious problem is 
that there is no clear demos defined (Sorenson 2002). Networks often stretch themselves 
over different governmental layers (municipalities, countries or even national 
governments) and include several functional actors.  
 
This certainly holds true in recent policy-making processes on water management 
– a case we examine below. Networks pose multilevel problems because rivers, safety 
problems and environmental issues are not restricted to one governmental level, which 
may result in a collision of authority between various groups among the ‘demos’. That 
makes it difficult to establish the ‘will of the people’ within these networks (or what 
constitute the ‘demos’ to phrase it differently) (Sorenson 2002).  
 
At the same time, we see a wide range of organisational and institutional 
arrangements that are added or partly replace the classical mechanisms of 
representational democracy (Skelcher et al. 2005).  These mechanisms are aimed at 
increasing effectiveness (and thus increasing output legitimacy) by involving actors who 
have important resources and can provide knowledge and solutions, or they have to 
obtain support for solutions before they can be implemented.  
 
Interactive governance thus asks for a reinterpretation of the classical criteria for 
measuring legitimacy. Sorenson and Torfing (2005), for instance, pose four questions that 
look at the democratic quality of networks: 
 
1. Are networks controlled by democratically-elected politicians? 
2. Do networks represent the interests, preferences and opinions of members of the 
different groups that are part of the network? 
3. Are networks accountable to the territorially-defined citizenry? 
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4. Do networks follow democratic rules, i.e. a specific set of rules for conduct? 
 
If we compare the four criteria of Sorenson and Torfing with the three sources of 
legitimacy elaborated on above, we see that number four very much resembles the source 
of good procedures, number two is related to what we have termed ‘voice’ (who actually 
participates) and numbers one and three are strongly related to what we have called 
accountability. 
 
Others stress process rules (the fact that networks have open access, that decision 
procedures are known and clear, etc.) as important to the judgment how well networks 
are in terms of democratic anchorage (Koppenjan and Klijn 2000).  This resembles some 
of the ideas from deliberative democracy models. The process rules could also include 
arrangements how to involve representational democratic institutions more explicitly in 
the decision-making in networks (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000).  Table 11.1 gives an 
overview of the three proposed sources of democratic legitimacy and the differences in a 
representational context and a governance network context. 
 
Table 11.1: Three principles in representative democracy and governance networks 
 Classical representational democracy Governance networks 
Accountability Accountability is simple and clearly 
demarcated (elected office holders). 
 
Accountability is diffuse and spread 
among different actors (even if formal 
elected bodies are present). 
Voice Voice is clearly arranged by fixed 
procedures of voting (elections) or maybe 
formal participation processes (arranged by 
law and regulations). In general, active 
possibilities of voice are not that large in 
pure representational democracy.  
Voice is complex because many actors 
involved and clear rules often are 
lacking. In principle, there are many 
opportunities for voice in networks, 
especially when actors use their 
dependency relations. Actual voice 
possibilities related to.  
Due 
deliberation 
Representational democracy is characterised 
by a limited set of clear developed rules for 
procedures. Even in the case of more 
deliberative democratic procedures, with 
instruments like referenda and citizens 
juries, these rules are clearly set out. 
 
Networks are characterised by a wide 
variety of institutional rules coming from 
various sources (various public 
authorities, self-made rules, informal 
rules, etc.), and it is a crowded 
institutional space. 
.  
As can be seen from Table 11.1, most of the sources of democratic legitimacy in 
representative democracy are far more straightforward than in governance networks, 
where there is more uncertainty about how to use the sources of legitimacy. Part of the 
problem is that in governance processes, the process is very important and many different 
decisions are taken over a long period of time during which arguments and choices 
change. So, democratic legitimacy is a characteristic that can change during time of the 
process. 
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Parameters for democratic legitimacy in networks 
We have to translate existing criteria for legitimacy to judge the nature of legitimacy of 
network governance. The three elements of accountability, voice and good procedures 
remain in function but have to be reinterpreted or given new meanings to apply them in 
the situation of governance networks. Actually, most of these refinements will appear 
similar to the ideas suggested in the literature on deliberative democracy because, in 
essence, interaction processes in networks are discussions about values between different 
actors who are interdependent and need each other for achieving solutions. So although 
governance networks are not a demos or city-state in the classical sense of the word like a 
‘polis’, they are a sort of community made up of interdependent relationships. The only 
difficulty is that they do not have such clear procedures and authority positions as the 
classical demos. 
 
In classical democratic theories, most of the legitimacy stems from input notions 
such as: if you arrange the positions and accountabilities in advance, it does not matter 
much how the process afterwards is organised. Scharpf already argued that one can make 
a distinction between output and input legitimacy (Scharpf 1997: 153–54). Others such as 
Easton (1953), who understood politics as the authorised allocations of values, also 
emphasises the throughput of a system. This fits the idea of governance as a process that 
also needs legitimacy during that process and not only at the start (input) or at the end 
(output). From this perspective, we derive a third notion of legitimacy: the notion of 
throughput legitimacy. Actually the deliberative democracy idea already introduces more 
throughput-like sources of legitimacy in the discussion. And this throughput seems an 
interesting thought in the context of networks in which the emphasis is on the complex 
decision-making and interaction between the involved actors. 
 
So we can distinguish between input, throughput and output legitimacy (Bekkers 
and Edwards 2006). When we combine the three elements of legitimacy (accountability, 
voice and due deliberation) with the three types of legitimacy (input, throughput, output), 
legitimacy questions for governance networks are formulated as in Table 11.2.  
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Table 11.2: Indicators of legitimacy 
 Input legitimacy Throughput legitimacy Output legitimacy 
Accountability  Who is accountable for 
the process to come to 
decisions? 
How are interactions 
between the participatory 
process and 
representational 
institutions secured? 
 
Indicators: formal 
authority of 
representative bodies and 
organised interfaces at 
the beginning 
How is feedback in the 
process between process 
interactions and the actors 
that are accountable 
arranged? 
 
Indicators: 
arranged/organised 
feedback moments to 
formal representative 
institutions 
Who is accountable for the 
final decision? 
How are representational 
institutions involved in the 
final decision-making 
stage? 
 
Indicators: formal organised 
authority for decision, 
actual involvement at the 
last stage 
Voice  How is the involvement 
of stakeholders arranged 
at the beginning of the 
process? 
What are the depth and 
width of voice 
possibilities? 
 
Indicators: regulations 
on entry stakeholders, 
possible subjects 
stakeholders have a say 
about and level of 
decisions 
What opportunities do 
actors have to participate 
in the actual process? 
 
Indicators: opportunities 
for voice (organised and 
invited) and actual 
participation (number of 
stakeholders, and intensity 
of participation) 
 
In what way can 
participants’ contributions 
be traced in decisions? 
Do the stakeholders 
involved support the 
decisions? 
 
Indicators: correspondence 
proposals with ideas 
stakeholders, satisfaction of 
stakeholders with result 
Due delibera 
tion  
Is there equal access to 
information, debate, etc.? 
Are the procedures 
transparent, clear and 
understandable?  
 
Indicators: entry 
possibilities and 
limitations (and 
regulations about that), 
clear procedures 
How are procedures 
applied during the 
process? 
Are actors satisfied with 
the transparency of the 
process? 
What is the quality of the 
debate? 
 
Indicators: satisfaction of 
actors with transparency, 
range of arguments 
brought forward (wide or 
narrow) 
Are participants satisfied 
with the quality of the 
process? 
Are actors satisfied with the 
quality of the debate of the 
(end) proposal? 
 
Indicators: overall 
satisfaction actors with 
process, judgement of 
argumentation 
 
We use this typology in the analysis of an example of complex decision-making 
that involves water management problems, in the case study of the Zuidplaspolder. 
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Interactive Governance: Zuidplaspolder 
The area called the Zuidplaspolder, between the cities Rotterdam, Gouda and Zotermer, 
in the west of The Netherlands came to existence in the 19
th
 century when it was laid dry. 
Until then it was a polder filled with water. The initiative came from King Willem I who 
also arranged the financing of the operation. Pumping out the water started in 1828 and 
was completed in 1839 when 4600 hectare new land was realized. 
Until the 60ies of the twentieth century the main function was agriculture. But after that 
greenhouse culture became very important, but the area also urbanized stronger as result 
of extensions of especially the cities Rotterdam and Zoetermeer. 
And recently also water management problems are becoming more pressing. Partly as 
result of global warming discussion (and the need to be prepared for more quantities of 
water), partly as result to growing need to store and transport water the need for an 
integral water management and the creation of more wetlands is put on the political 
agenda. 
At the same time environmental groups complain about the ongoing industrial and urban 
activities which result in a slowly, incremental loss of the  (green) characteristics of the 
original polder 
So the problems in this area typically have the character of a wicked problem (Ritter and 
Webber 1973): there is more than one problem at stake and these problems are connected 
to each other but also conflict with each other. There are many actors involved (both as 
problem owners and/or actors with indispensible resources) who not only have different 
perceptions of the problems but also of the desirable solutions. And in a media driven 
world many of these actors try to get involved in the decision-making process and thus 
these decision making processes are really a struggle about which values should prevail 
in public policy (environmental values, transport values, urban extension, etc) and 
different actors represent these different values at stake (Klijn, 2008).  
 
 
Governance Network and Rounds in the Decision-making Process 
Under the initiative of the province, a governance network formed itself around the issue 
of reconstructing the polder The province deliberately and actively tried to attract all the 
main stakeholders from the start in 2002. In that sense, the case is clearly an example of 
interactive governance. A large group of twenty-three stakeholders was involved in the 
decision-making process by means of a steering committee. There were actors from a 
number of environmental groups and agricultural organisations (and especially from the 
greenhouse firms that are present in the Zuidplaspolder) together with the involved 
municipalities and several central government departments (Ministry of Transport, 
Ministry of Housing and Ministry of Agriculture). 
 
If we look at the decision process from 2001/2002 through to 2009 we can see 
three rounds in the decision-making process. Table 11.3 provides an overview of the 
process. 
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Table 11.3: Rounds in the decision-making process on the Zuidplaspolder 
 Round 1: exploring a 
content (2001–2004) 
Round 2: elaborating in a 
smaller arena (2004–2006) 
Round 3: working to an 
implementation 
programme (2006–2009) 
Involved 
actors 
Wide group of actors, 
province of  South Holland 
initiator and network 
managers 
A smaller core of main 
actors (the ‘steering group’ 
that includes municipalities 
and province) and a wider 
group of actors (called the 
‘forum’) less intensively 
involved 
Same as round 2 
Character 
of decision-
making 
process 
Strong exploring character, 
looking for innovative content 
ideas that can satisfy 
stakeholders’ demands and 
create support for the project 
More focused interaction in 
which the ideas of the first 
round are developed and 
specified  
Emphasis on translation of  
ideas to formal legally-
binding documents, less 
interactive character of the 
process and increasing of 
conflicts (because costs and 
benefits have to be 
finalised)  
Important 
decisions 
Start: initiative from central 
government and province for 
area. 
End: producing a main policy 
document (ISV, integrated 
structure vision), which sets 
the main goals and desires for 
the area 
Realising more elaborated 
and specific policy 
documents (especially ISP)  
that operationalises the 
ideas in the ISV 
 
Working on formal 
municipality planning and 
zoning documents (the so-
called 
bestemmingsplannen) that 
have legally-binding status  
(Network 
managemen
t) strategies 
Open, aimed at searching 
content, looking for wide 
support and trying to combine 
different values. Management 
strategies aimed at exploring 
content and connecting actors 
Open, strong attempt to 
guide and organise process 
(steering group, project 
group, many meetings and 
conferences) – securing 
support by maintaining 
connections and 
communicating ideas 
 
Maintaining coalition but 
emphasis on possibilities to 
implement; lobbying for 
greater involvement of 
central government, more 
dominated by formal legal 
requirements of the process  
Content 
choices 
Attempt to combine need for 
more dwellings (urban 
expansion) with need to secure 
green areas, restructuring 
greenhouses and water 
management problems 
Working out the 
possibilities for extra 
dwellings (which make the 
plan economically viable); 
at the same time, look more 
closely at possibilities of 
water storages and green 
areas 
More emphasis on 
economic and political 
feasibility; stress on 
possibilities for 
implementation 
 
 
First round: exploring the possible options 
The first round is very interactive. The process began in January 2002 with a large 
working conference, where all the stakeholders were present at the negotiating table. A 
covenant is agreed upon (signed on the 27th of February) in which the main goals for the 
area are mentioned, including the restructuring and, if possible, the replacement of the 
greenhouses.  
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This interactive character is reinforced by a document from the province (at the 
beginning of 2003), the initiator of the process, in which the communicative and 
participative character of the process is stressed and the importance of all stakeholders 
having equal access to all information and knowledge. Using the idea of the participation 
ladder, the document identified for each target group the means of involvement and the 
communication activities.  
 
The actors work on a joint ‘area map’ in which for every sub-area the possibilities 
and impossibilities are shown. The main conclusions regarding the activities (completed 
in the autumn of 2003) were: 
 
 new dwellings are possible, but not everywhere in the polder; 
 a logical green structure is very important; 
 use the cores of the old villages of the small municipalities in the Zuidplaspolder; 
 improvement of the infrastructure is important to realise the ambitions; 
 there is a need for new places to store water (retention areas). 
 
Based on the area map, actors interact further and also discuss the establishment 
of a ‘Land Bank’ that buys strategic parts of the area for development. At the same time, 
however, private actors (developers) also buy significant sections of land (mostly from 
farmers) to provide themselves a strategic position in the decision-making process. The 
Land Bank is established in July 2004 and at the end of 2004 the involved actors agree on 
a first policy document (ISV), which contains: 
 
 a new build environment – the ISV states that there is room for 15,000–30,000 new 
dwellings, 150–350 commercial areas and 200 hectares of extra greenhouses 
 a division of the area of the polder into three parts – a northern area suited for new 
dwellings and greenhouses, a southern area to be developed as green area (with some 
small areas for dwellings) also suitable for retention area and  water storage, and a 
middle area where ecological and recreational functions would be established 
 
At the end of 2004, the project bureau organised a large working conference to 
discuss the main ideas of the ISV.  All of the stakeholders attended, which was one of the 
explicit functions of this large conference. Over the following years, the project bureau 
uses large conferences to inform stakeholders, present the latest ideas and generally 
communicate with stakeholders. 
 
Second round: refining the plan 
The second round commenced with a large number of information meetings to 
communicate the ideas in the ISV to all stakeholders, but also to the citizens of the 
municipalities in the area. 
 
At the same time activities proceeded to develop the preliminary ideas of the ISV 
in a more operationally-led way in a new document that had to function as the basis for 
the legally-binding documents that will be made by the municipalities (in the third 
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round). The steering committee was reduced to the core actors (municipalities and 
province), while the other actors are a little less involved, but still active, in the process. 
 
In June 2005, the project bureau again organised a large two-day conference in 
which the latest developments were discussed. On the first day, mostly citizens were 
contacted and on the second day it was politicians of the municipalities and province. The 
new document ISP (inter-municipal structure plan) was completed at end of 2005. The 
documents built on the three zones in the area and for the northern area there was a new 
development of greenhouses and development of infrastructure. The middle area also saw 
new dwellings projected and also a new green area was added. The south area was 
reserved for nature development and a limited number of high quality dwellings in green 
areas. The number of dwelling in this document was slightly reduced to 15,000 dwellings 
(compared with a maximum of 30,000 dwellings). The ISP was discussed in all the 
municipal councils and did not meet much resistance. Most of the comments have to do 
with the emphasis on a good infrastructure, the economic perspectives of farmers (being a 
significant voter group in some of the municipalities) and remarks about the financing of 
the whole project. 
 
Third round: working to an implementation program (2006–2010) 
From 2006, the project bureau and involved actors in the network dedicated themselves 
to elaborate the ideas in the implementation plans and legally-binding zoning plans (the 
so-called bestemmingsplannen that have to be made and authorised by the 
municipalities). In March 2006, the first ideas for revising the province’s legal plans were 
presented. To prepare the discussion, provincial council members visit the area and are 
informed of the project. On 22nd June 2006, another large conference took place. Besides 
information sharing and a discussion about the green character and condition of the 
development of the area, several covenants between various partners were officially 
signed, giving the day a symbolic meaning. 
 
At the end of the year, several plans and environmental studies were presented, 
especially about which of the southern part of the area should become a green area. Then 
another large meeting was held by the project group, which was dedicated to new 
innovative ideas (especially about environmental-friendly developments of the area). At 
the beginning of 2007, there was a political disturbance at the central government level 
(an MP in the national parliament criticised the development of the area because, 
geographically, it is one of the lowest points in the Netherlands), but the project group 
effectively disarms this. The remainder of 2007 was characterised by pressure-cooker 
decision-making about a number of documents and studies that are obliged before plans 
can receive a legal status at all. The new Minister of Housing and Environmental Affairs 
(a new cabinet was installed mid-2007) visited the area and gave support for the 
development.  
 
At the end of 2007, central government, which was charmed by the ideas and the 
pace of the decision-making, was encouraged by the actors of the Zuidplaspolder to 
include the project in the Randstad Urgency project, a central programme of important 
projects that have special interest and support of the central departments. The Ministry of 
Housing and Environmental Affairs became the coordinating ministry and took a seat on 
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the steering group of the project to show its interest and involvement. There was a 
discussion again about the number of dwellings to be realised in the area and the 
compromise is that the development started with 7000 new dwellings. The project bureau 
explicitly stated that this was only the first phase and that more could be built later. The 
new involvement of central government led to a promise in 2008 of 100 million euros for 
investment in the infrastructure and in environmentally-friendly projects.  
 
Most of the legal documents were realised and accepted by the municipal councils 
in 2008 and the beginning of 2009. There was much attention paid to the organised 
sessions to inform citizens of the formal zoning plans (bestemmingsplannen). In general, 
there were few complaints and legal objections. There was the first agreement with 
private developers to start building dwellings in 2010. These activities proved to be 
slightly difficult in 2010 owing to less favourable economic times and discussions about 
the amount of money to be reserved for environmental goals in the project. It was crucial 
to retain the support from various environmental groups for the development. 
 
Democratic Legitimacy in the Zuidplaspolder 
How was democratic legitimacy achieved in the case of Zuidplaspolder? We deal with 
the three forms of legitimacy: accountability, voice and due process before we formulate 
a conclusion. 
 
Accountability: Securing Democratic Legitimacy by Connecting Democratic 
Institutions 
Table 11.4 shows that the representational institutions are intensely involved in the 
process of democratic legitimacy, mainly because the project bureau arranged it. It is 
especially the ‘throughput legitimacy’ that is important here. By means of special 
organised meetings, providing information and reports, the project bureau attempts to tie 
the municipal councils and provincial council close to the project’s development. The 
‘output legitimacy’ is mainly secured by classical forms of accountability because the 
councils have to agree on the documents. The ‘input accountability’ is slightly more 
complicated. Of course, in the first place we have the normal accountability rules of the 
politicians who initiate the process and are controlled by their councils. This is nothing 
new. But the involvement of the steering group with all the different stakeholders 
complicates matters, since these members can be held accountable for the actions of their 
organisations. An example is the agreement about environmental greenhouses. In the 
process, the province and the farmers’ organisation (especially the greenhouse farmers) 
had to agree on realising environmentally-friendly greenhouses (using more sun heat, 
using additional energy for other purposes, etc.). Members of the farmers’ organisation 
were especially keen on this, but it had to be acknowledged by organisation itself. 
Covenants were laid down to finalise the agreement and these could be seen, in turn, as 
means to create output legitimacy. Of course, these covenants in the main do not have 
any legal basis, which means that trust between actors is very important. 
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Table 11.4: Parameters for legitimacy in governance networks and interactive decision-
making 
 Input legitimacy Throughput legitimacy Output legitimacy 
Accountability 
(How 
accountability is 
arranged, who is 
held accountable 
and, especially, 
how the connection 
to classical 
representational 
institutions is 
arranged) 
 decision to start is 
mainly made by city 
aldermen and 
province, formal 
accountability, 
aldermen controlled 
by councils – classic 
 involvement of other 
stakeholders makes 
them accountable, if 
not formally then 
empirically 
 members in steering 
group accountable for 
their organisations’ 
decisions 
  
 Feedback secured by: 
 regular meetings 
(twice a year) of 
municipal councils 
and province council 
 regular information 
provided by the 
project bureau 
 information trough 
studies and reports  
 
Conclusion: active 
feedback to and 
organised information to 
city and county councils 
(+) 
 municipal and 
provincial councils 
have to accept all 
main documents 
(ISV, ISP, and formal 
zoning plans) 
 using covenants as 
mutually-binding 
documents between 
actors 
 
Conclusion: classical 
forms of legitimacy well 
established (+, +/-) 
 
 
Voice: Involvement and Support of Stakeholders 
In general the involvement of various stakeholders is fairly intensive. Citizens were more 
involved on an ad hoc basis, in the sense that the participation process was more geared 
towards (well) organised interest groups such as environmental and agricultural 
organisations. The covenants functioned as binding decisions between actors and as a 
communication of decisions to formal political institutions. 
 
Table 11.5: Parameters for legitimacy in governance networks and interactive decision-
making 
 Input legitimacy Throughput legitimacy Output legitimacy 
Voice (how 
participation of 
stakeholders is 
arranged) 
 wide definition of 
stakeholders (width is 
large) 
 not all stakeholders are 
involved in the same 
intense way (citizens less 
so than some of the core 
interest groups such as 
environmental and 
agricultural organisations) 
 participation secured by 
steering group (well 
organised interest) and 
large conference and 
interactive sessions 
(generating ideas, 
criticisms and comments) 
 stakeholders explicitly 
invited to participate 
(most strongly in first 
round) 
 involvement of 
stakeholders 
connected especially 
through documents 
(formal documents, 
but also through 
covenants and 
agreements that are 
made public) 
 
Conclusion: fairly intense 
interaction (+) 
 many contributions, 
both from the area 
guide and in terms 
of general ideas – 
in what way can  
participants 
contributions be 
traced in decisions 
 stakeholders in 
general are satisfied 
about their 
participation 
possibilities 
  
Conclusion: much 
support from 
stakeholders for both 
process and content (+) 
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This results in fairly strong support from most of the stakeholders for both the 
process and the content of the decision-making process. This can be clearly demonstrated 
by an event in March 2007 when the process was suddenly in the media spotlight. A 
Member of Parliament voiced strong criticisms against plans to realise 7,500 to 15,000 
new dwellings in the area. A greenfield development building houses at the lowest point 
of the Netherlands made no sense, according to the MP, and should be reconsidered; the 
area should retain its green and agricultural character. The (national) newspapers 
immediately picked up the issue and the otherwise relatively technocratic project 
suddenly found itself under full public and media scrutiny. However the project 
organisation could by now draw on considerable support. Several actors involved in the 
Zuidplaspolder project countered these criticisms in unison, and said the MP was talking 
nonsense. These included the province (the project leader), the representative from the 
environmental movement (surprising, given that the MP was arguing against building 
new houses on agricultural land) and the chair of the water management board 
(Dijkgraaf), who would normally be quite sympathetic to some of the MP’s arguments. 
 
The responsible project leader of the province told the newspapers: ‘Miss Vermey 
[the MP objecting to the project] can of course say what she wants, but it would have 
been wiser if she had looked at the history of the project. If she had done that, she would 
have seen that the developments in the Zuidplaspolder take the future climate changes 
into account’ (Cobouw, 24th March 2007). The representative of the environmental 
organisation voiced her discontent even more strongly: ‘The past years everywhere 
greenhouses and dwellings have been added incrementally. I rather prefer an integral plan 
than this unnoticed messing up of the area … The past years we have been seriously 
engaged with this polder. Voicing protests now without knowing anything about the 
project is cheap politics’ (Trouw, Thursday 29th March 2007).  
 
Due Deliberation 
In general, the process fulfilled most of the requirements of due deliberation, although 
this held more for the involved stakeholders in the steering group than affected citizens in 
the various municipalities, who were clearly less involved and had less access to the 
information. Discussion and debate were encouraged through a large number of meetings 
and gatherings that proved to be of a fairly high quality, which meant the project group 
had a significant advantage over other actors because of greater access to information. 
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Table 11.6: Parameters for legitimacy in governance networks and interactive decision-
making 
 Input legitimacy Throughput legitimacy Output legitimacy 
Due 
deliberation 
(how  debate 
and 
argumentation 
process is 
structured) 
 process relatively 
open for new 
arguments and 
information. Content 
was relatively open at 
the beginning 
 mostly equal access 
to information for 
stakeholders involved 
in steering group, less 
so for interested 
citizens 
 
Conclusion: good 
conditions for open 
dialogue (+) 
 debate encouraged by 
wide arrangement of 
seminars, 
conferences and 
information 
collection (like the 
area guide), but also 
by formal 
requirements (e.g. 
environmental impact 
assessment) 
 quality of the debate 
relatively high. Much 
information available 
(through many 
studies are a guide, 
etc) through many 
conferences and 
seminars relatively 
much discussion 
about options  
 
Conclusion: adequate 
(+/-) 
 participants are satisfied 
about the process quality 
 argumentation – strong 
emphasis on combining 
different values, area 
should be global warming 
proof (with good water 
quality storage and 
management), high quality 
dwellings and green areas, 
and restructuring of 
greenhouses. In general, 
much support and 
appreciation for the content 
of the plans 
 
Conclusion: relatively high 
output legitimacy  (+) 
 
This results in a fairly high output legitimacy in general there is strong support for 
most of the content of the policy from almost all the actors who also are fairly satisfied 
with the way the process and the argumentation  
 
Conclusion: Interactive Process with Intensive Involvement of Democratic Institutions 
In general, there was a fairly open process, with a high quality of dialogue. If we use the 
criteria developed in the second section most of the criteria receives a positive score. One 
can say that the general participation was fairly intense, while the involvement of 
representational institutions was high and the quality of the debate was good. This 
resulted in strong support from the main stakeholders, even those who would normally be 
critical, such as the environmental groups. One can say that the consideration given to the 
three aspects of legitimacy – accountability, voice and due deliberation – in both input 
and throughput phases resulted in strong output legitimacy. 
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Conclusions: Creating Legitimacy and the Effects on 
Outcomes 
Governance processes try to find solutions that satisfy various values that are at stake and 
represented in the governance network as seen in the case study. Creating democratic 
legitimacy is a crucial element of the governance process. That much attention is given to 
this dimension of governance must be seen as a very positive development. 
In this chapter, we advanced criteria to judge that democratic legitimacy and applied 
them to a specific case. We developed criteria from the democracy discussion and the 
various types of democracy that emerged. But, of course, there can be debated whether 
these criteria represent the full range of possibilities. And depending on the preference for 
a specific conception of democracy, people will probably favour different criteria as 
important. 
 
That also means that the criteria of democratic legitimacy can be used in a 
normative sense (these are the criteria that should be met) or as an empirical tool (which 
of the criteria are met and what are their effects). Normatively speaking, one can prefer 
one type of legitimacy, for instance the classic parliamentary accountability criteria, over 
others. That also means that one would judge them to be more crucial empirically than 
the others. However, one could also approach this problem empirically and ask which of 
the legitimacies, if present, contribute most to good outcomes (which can be measured by 
the time it takes to make decisions, the quality and innovativeness of decisions, etc.). This 
approach is a quite different from the preceding one. Given our earlier findings that 
stakeholder involvement is more important for reaching good outcomes than political 
involvement (Edelenbos et al. 2010), the expectation may be that the last two forms of 
legitimacy contribute more to outcomes in interactive governance than the first one. 
Interestingly, the criteria can fulfil a good function in both discussions. 
 
And last but not least, the case study shows that democratic legitimacy in each of 
the three dimensions is primarily reached through very active network management. Even 
the classical representational accountability criteria were greatly enhanced by actively 
informing and involving elected politicians in the process. This seems to point at a more 
peaceful co-existence of representational democracy and networks then we often find in 
the literature. This also means that it is important to look at the design of decision-making 
in governance networks and secure rules that enhance democratic legitimacy in those 
networks. The criteria also provide a guideline to which type of legitimacy one can and 
would like to enhance. Agency is crucial also for democratic legitimacy. 
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